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Today with technical advances and cost reductions in
electronics, it has become possible to recategorize many
FLRS and DLRS as progressive repairables. This thesis
covers the growing problem of No Evidence of Failure (NEOF)
among these progressive repairables and how Miniature-
Microminiature (2M) repair capability can be used to
correct this problem. The major objective is to demonstrate
how 2M repair capability can save O&MN funding and decrease
the Repair Turnaround Time (RTAT) for repairables. Two NSNs
were chosen from the Support and Test Equipment Engineering
Program (STEEP) tests performed by SIMA San Diego during
1987. A statistical analysis and a Level Of Repair Analysis
(LORA) were run on both. Research was also conducted on
possible changes and uses for shipboard 3-M documentation.
The main conclusion of this thesis is that with proper
training and implementation, 2M repair capability can save
O&MN funding, decrease RTAT for both FLRs and DLRs, and
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In dealing with the perceived military threats of the
world today, the United States government has made the
decision to field weapon systems on the absolute cutting
edge of technology. The acquisition of increasingly complex
weapon systems into the U.S. Fleet has caused an important
evolution in maintenance philosophies and supply management
procedures. In order to keep Operational Availability (Ao)
high, engineers and logisticians have opted in many cases
for modularization in system design. The use of
modularization has allowed field units to repair downed
systems by simply replacing the Printed Circuit Boards
(PCBs) and Electronic Modules (EMs) which are suspected to
have failed according to the system's repair matrix. This
repair philosophy of replacing parts in the dark until a
unit is repaired, however, has caused another problem which
is known today as No Evidence of Failure (NEOF) among
repairables. NEOF rates today are running approximately
thirty-percent for all Navy depot level repairables (DLRs)
being turned in today. Studies show that approximately
thirty million dollars of the fleet operational commanders'
Operations and Maintenance Navy (O&MN) Operating Target
(OPTAR) funding is being syphoned off into the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF) to induct supposedly Not Ready For Issue (NRFI)
material into the repair cycle. This material is
subsequently found to be Ready For Issue (RFI) and is
returned to the supply system.
Today, as defense funding is reduced, the services must
investigate less costly ways of keeping Operational
Availability (Ao) high for its systems. The Navy must find
ways of using present programs and abilities to minimize
the use of available funding while maximizing the fleets
Ao. One major way of saving funding is the screening of
repairables prior to their passing into the repair cycle.
All items managed by the Navy's wholesale supply system
are categorized during the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)
as to what level of maintenance is required to repair an
end item. Additionally, the LSA details the numbers of
personnel, level of training, and types of support
equipment needed to support a system over its life cycle.
However, with advancements in technology and the lowering
of costs of electronic test devices, it has become possible
today to equip most ships with digital test equipment
capable of field testing failed PCBs prior to their being
turned in for repair. Intermediate Maintenance Activities
(IMAs) have been given even greater abilities in testing
and repair capabilities than have field level activities.
This capability, if implemented and used properly, could
turn the tide on the problem of NEOF among repairables.
Fleet commanders could see operational availability
remaining high while maximizing the use of their O&MN
funding for repairs.
B. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this thesis will be to research
literature and instructions as well as to use test results
from IMAs dealing with Miniature/Microminiature (2M) repair
and repairables management. This will be done in order to
gather data for a statistical analysis. Findings from an
experiment performed at the Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (SIMA) San Diego, NEOF rates from the Fleet
Analysis Center, Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach,
California, and data from SPCC will be used to determine
the Coefficients of Correlations (r) between the dollar
cost for repair contracts and the cost to a ship's OPTAR
account. The Coefficient of Determination (r2 ) will also be
obtained in order to explain the percentage variation in
total dollar value of contracts let for repair of the
National Stock Numbers (NSNs) identified by SIMA San Diego.
It will also examine the contracts for the repair of these
NSNs to determine whether or not full payment is made to
the repair depot for items which test RFI during the open
and inspect portion of the repair process.
This thesis will also investigate the use of NAVSEA's
LORA model as a method of determining what material can be
shifted to 3H Cognizant (COG) material. It will also
examine if shipboard 3-M data can be used to compensate for
lost procurement information on material shifted to 3H COG.
Finally, this thesis will try to answer the questions:
Can the use of 2M repair capabilities at the operational
and intermediate levels save money for the Navy? Which
items should be chosen for migration to 3H COG? Can
shipboard 3-M documentation be used to compensate SPCC for
lost procurement usage data for items repaired at the
operational and intermediate levels?
C. ORGANIZATION
Chapter III will discuss past projects in connection
with 2M repair capability at the operational and
intermediate levels. It will also provide the data with
which the statistical analysis for the Coefficient of
Correlation (r) and the Coefficient of Determination (r2 )
will be performed and their limitations discussed. The
methods of repair contracting used by SPCC will also be
investigated to determine how money paid for repairs is
used and what happens to payment made for the repair of
ready for issue items. The focus of the analysis will be
whether money can be saved for the Navy by using 2M repair
capability to a greater extent at the organizational and
intermediate maintenance levels. Chapter IV will discuss
the NAVSEA LORA models as they are today and how they might
be used to help SPCC locate material for migration to 3H
COG. In Chapter V, the afloat 3-M system is investigated to
determine how the NAVSUP form 4790. 2K could be used to
generate previously unavailable usage data for SPCC on
material coded as a progressive repairable. The final
chapter will draw conclusions about the use of 2M repair
capability and make recommendations dealing with COG




The acquisition of repair parts for a new system is a
long and complex ordeal. The decisions as to what material
is to be procured as spares for supportability and the
classification of these items are made as early in the
systems acquisition process as possible. To ensure that
these decisions are the best and the most appropriate for a
specific system, the Program Manager (PM) is required to
create, maintain, and refine an Integrated Logistics
Support Plan (ILSP) beginning in the Concept and
Exploration Phase and maintain it throughout the entire
acquisition process. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is
described as "...a unified and iterative process that
integrates logistics support considerations and maintenance
techniques {e.g., Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
}
into the design effort in order to obtain reliable,
maintainable, transportable, and supportable equipment at a
minimum cost of ownership throughout the equipment's life
cycle." [Ref. 9:p. III-3]
In the Program Management Office (PMO) , the Logistics
Manager (LM) is responsible for the direction of the ILS.
He is guided in this task by numerous directives from
higher authority that affect a wide range of supply and
maintenance functional areas. Item classification and
maintenance level determination are made for each item of
supply during the acquisition process.
A key step in the ILS is the Logistic Support Analysis
(LSA)
.
The LSA serves as "...a continuing dialogue between
the weapon system designer and the logistician. . . " with the
prime objective of ensuring "...the acquisition of
operationally effective and supportable equipment at a
minimum (or optimal) cost through the system's life cycle."
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Figure 1. LSA Process [Ref. 9:p. III-5]
A specific trade-off analysis undertaken as part of the
LSA is the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) . "The purpose of
the Level of Repair Analysis is to aid establishment of
least cost maintenance actions and to influence equipment
design." [Ref. l:p. 2-11] Using the LORA, the LM decides:
"...(a) if an item should be repaired; (b) if so, at what
maintenance level (organizational, intermediate, or depot);
or (c) if the item should be discarded." [Ref. 9:p. III-7]
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Figure 2. Level of Repair Analysis [Ref. 9:p III-8]
Information gathered on equipment concerning
reliability, availability, and maintainability factors in
these early phases of the acquisition process are used by
the LM to create the overall system maintenance plan and
the Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability (SM&R) codes
for the different parts comprising that system.
SM&R codes communicate maintenance and supply
instructions to logistics support echelons and user
commands. Specifically, Joint Service uniform SM&R codes
identify the manner of acquiring support items for the
maintenance, repair, or overhaul of end items; indicate
the maintenance levels authorized for performing the
required maintenance functions; and prescribe the
disposition action for unserviceable support items. The
initial assignment of SM&R codes takes place prior to
provisioning to permit the procurement of a range of
spares and repair parts to support new weapons, systems,
and equipment. The SM&R code is made up of a six-digit
code. The first two positions consist of a two-position
source code. The source code indicates the manner of
acquiring an item for maintenance, repair or overhaul of
end items. The second two positions represent a
maintenance code. The maintenance code indicates the
lowest maintenance level authorized to remove, replace,
and use the item. The fifth position is held by the
recoverability code. The recoverability code amplifies
the information provided by the maintenance code and
indicates the lowest level of maintenance authorized to
perform all possible repair actions and to dispose of the
unserviceable support item. The sixth position of the
SM&R code is reserved for service options. In the Navy,
it is used to provide special instructions and for
internal management purposes. [Ref. 9: pp. 111-12-16]
The combination of a parts maintenance coding and
recoverability coding identifies the material as either a
consumable, Field Level Repairable (FLR) , or Depot Level
Repairable (DLR) . A consumable is a part that cannot be
economically repaired (i.e., it is less costly to replace
than repair) . Material is designated as a FLR when it is
less costly to provide the required training, equipment,
and expertise at either the organizational or intermediate
level to make repairs to an item. DLRs have been so
designated because it has been determined that it is more
economical to repair at either an organic (Navy owned) or
commercial repair depot. Appendices B, C, and D list the
most frequently used third, fourth, and fifth position SM&R
codes used today to identify an item's maintenance and
recoverability by the ICPs.
Material is further segregated by the Inventory
Managers (IMs) through the use of Material Condition Codes
(MCCs) . The MCCs group items together into specific
categories for reporting purposes. Appendix E lists
commonly used MCCs and their meanings.
As present-day military hardware has developed into
highly complicated weapon systems, engineers have relied
more and more on the concept of repairable modules to meet
requirements for systems availability and component
reliability goals. Modularization has greatly facilitated
the ease of maintenance and repair at the organizational
level. However, this trend towards modularization has
resulted in a corresponding increase in the number, value,
and significance of repairable items. Repairables today now
comprise an important segment of the workload of all major
Navy industrial activities. Quick and accurate component
rework is a major contributor to the effectiveness,
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support, and readiness of Navy ships and aircraft. However,
this augmented demand for DLR repairs has outstripped the
organic depot capabilities, and the Navy has had to resort
to commercial activities to maintain DLR Repair Turnaround
Times (RTATs) . Predetermined forecasts of RTATs is a
dominant force affecting the operational availability and
life cycle cost of a weapon system. Table 1 below reflects
the growing trend towards commercial contracts for DLR
repair at one of the Navy's Inventory Control Points
(ICPs) , Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)
.
TABLE 1. ORGANIC AND COMMERCIAL
REPAIR TOTALS [Ref. 12 :p. 1]
Fiscal Organic Commercial Total
Year Repairs RepairS Repairs
FY-81 66M 44M 110M
FY-84 88M 149M 237M
FY-87 106M 213M 319M
In response to public outcry against perceived wasteful
government spending and the exorbitant cost of today's
weapon systems, coupled with pressure from the CNO to
attain advertised systems operational availability goals,
the Navy has sought to improve its contracting and
logistical support processes. The massive increase in the
number of DLRs in the Navy's inventory has necessitated
streamlining and improvement in all facets of DLR
management.
One change that has occurred in the past few years has
been in the way DLRs are handled at the organizational
11
level. There is the new Advanced Tracking and Control
(ATAC) program for central management of DLRs and the new
signature control incentives involving all repairables
movement. However, one of the most aggressive of all the
new incentives dealing with DLRs is the move toward
progressive repairs of DLRs. Prior to this concept,
repairables were divided into the groupings of FLRs and
DLRs. Under the progressive repair concept, organizational
and intermediate level activities have been outfitted with
Automatic Testing Equipment (ATE) , Test Program Sets
(TPSs) , and Miniature/Microminiature (2M) repair stations.
This has allowed these facilities for the first time the
ability to inspect and repair repairables which before
could only have been tested at a higher maintenance level.
Progressive repairables are determined by analyzing the
fourth and fifth positions SM&R codes assigned. Items which
are considered progressive FLR are coded with an F, G, H,
or in the fourth position of the SM&R code and either a G
or a H in the fifth position of the SM&R code. Progressive
DLRs carry a fourth SM&R position of G, H, or and a fifth
position of D.
The confusion concerning repairables results mainly
because the information is not readily apparent to the
repair technician and storekeeper. All information dealing
with an item's SM&R code is located in one and only one
location, and that is the command's COSAL. An item coded
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1HD is known to be a FLR from its COG and MCC, and an item
coded 7HH is known to be a DLR from its coding. In fact,
both items may be progressive repairables, but this would
never be known unless their SM&R codes are reviewed.
To correct the ambiguity among FLRs, on 10 April 1985,
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) authorized
the establishment of the new cognizance symbol 3H for use
at SPCC and ASO. 3H material would still be FLRs just as
they had been as 1H material, but the ambiguity of the MCC
D would be placed to rest. The technician would now be able
to look at the COG and tell whether he had condemnation
authority or not (i.e., 1H yes, 3H no).
Continued improvements and addition of new TPSs,
technological advances in electronics, and the lowering of
costs to the point where each ship can be provided with
digital test equipment has furthered the abilities of
organizational and intermediate commands to test and repair
DLRs at below depot level. The equipment presently being
provided by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to all
afloat units for this purpose is the AN/USM-465, also
known as the GENRAD 2225 Portable Service Processor (PSP)
.
The 4 65 is presently capable of testing hundreds of
different Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) from twenty-nine
different weapon systems. The only requirement for the
afloat units is the changing of the test program, which
gives the test parameters for the PCB being tested and at
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times certain hardware changes. Intermediate Maintenance
Activities (IMAs) , in addition to the AN/USM-465, have been
issued PHOENIX-530 units and analog test units. The
PHOENIX-530 is capable of checking PCBs for an additional
nine weapon systems.
While Miniature/Microminiature (2M) repair at the
organizational level has been highly effective in
decreasing Repair Turnaround Times (RTAT) and reducing cost
to TYCOMs and field level OPTAR accounts, there has been an
alarming increase in the number of No Evidence of Failure
(NEOF) material appearing at repair depots among those DLRs
which can be screened and often repaired at the
organizational and intermediate levels. This situation has
had several effects:
1. It has reduced local OPTAR accounts for material




It has added work to repair depots which are already
overworked.
3. It has increased the RTAT for many progressive
repairables.
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III. MINIATURE/MICROMINIATURE (2M) REPAIR CAPABILITY
A. BACKGROUND
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1978 Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM) initiated the Support and Test
Equipment Engineering Program (STEEP) to test the
feasibility of screening, testing, and repairing
Electronic Modules (EMs) and PCBs. The pilot program
involved screening, testing, and repairing of EMs/PCBs
for both COMNAVSEASYSCOM and Commander, Naval Electronic
Systems Command by using Automatic Test Equipment (ATE)
located at selected shore intermediate maintenance
activities. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
Since 1978, one hundred forty-eight ATEs and
approximately six hundred seventy TPSs have been purchased
for the fleet and intermediate repair levels. An additional
one hundred ATEs have been authorized but have not as yet
been placed in service. Two types of TPSs are presently in
use at the organizational and intermediate levels. The
first type of TPS is a screening only TPS . "Screening only
IPS identify whether the EM/PCB are ready for issue or
defective (i.e., go/no-go)." [Ref. 4: p. 2] The second type
of TPS is called a diagnostic TPS. "...Diagnostic TPS not
only to identify whether EM/PCBs are go/no-go, but also
fault isolate defects to enable technicians to make
necessary repairs." [Ref. 4:p. 2]
Miniature/Microminiature repair technicians can carry
four different Navy Enlisted Classifications (NECs) .
Miniature repair technicians carry a NEC of 9527, and
15
microminiature repair technicians carry the NEC 9526. A 2M
repair technician carries both NECs. 2M inspectors carry
NEC 9503, and 2M instructors carry NEC 9509. Presently, 2M
NECs are considered secondary NECs and are not mandatory
for ship's repair personnel being assigned to a ship with
either a 2M repair station or an AN/USM-465 test set.
Afloat requests for either an ATE (AN/USM-4 65) or a 2M
repair station are forwarded to NAVSEA code 06Q for
consideration. 2M repair stations presently cost
approximately $6,000.00 to supply, and an AN/USM-465 costs
approximately $55,000.00.
According to the 1983 Western Region Navy Audit Report,
The dominant cost savings were attributable to major
reductions in supply pipeline costs resulting from a
lowering of false removal rates applicable to EMs/PCBs
ambiguity groups. Ambiguity groups of EMs/PCBs within a
principle electronic system usually consist of three to
five EMs/PCBs; and when one EM/PCB fails, the entire
group is considered defective.... [Ref. 4:p. 5]
Repairable material at SPCC is presently classified as
shown in Table 2
.
TABLE 2. NUMBERS OF DLRs BY CLASSIFICATION
Applicable No. of
SM&R Codes Line Items
Depot Level DD 17,678
Progressive 2D, 3D ,GD, HD, OD 136,917
Depot Level 2L, 5D, 6D, 3L
Progressive HH, 2G, OG, GG 89,918
Field Level 2H, OH, OF,
Field Level 2Z, 00 23,231
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As can be seen from the data presented in Table 2,
thousands or EMs/PCBs are eligible for review/repair at the
organizational and intermediate levels. These parts also
constitute a large portion of the items which fall into the
previously mentioned ambiguity groups. Today's problem of
NEOF is partially due to material that is not being
properly screened at the organizational and intermediate
levels prior to being turned in for depot repair. Money
charged to OPTAR accounts for repair of NEOF DLRs is paid
either entirely or partially to the repair depot with the
remainder being applied to the Navy's revolving stock fund
account.
A 1985 Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station
report stated that ".. .sixty- four ships participating in
their survey estimated that 980 Casualty Reports (CASREPs)
were averted as a direct result of the 2M repair program."
[Ref. 2:p. 2] In 1984, the USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70)
conducted a study under the direction of Commander Naval
Aviation Forces Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT) and Naval
Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station (NAVSEACOMBATSYS-
ENGSTA) Norfolk, Virginia to perform as many 2M repairs as
possible during its 1984 deployment. The results of that
test period are shown in Table 3
.
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TABLE 3. COST AND SAVINGS STATISTICS [Ref. 3: p. 7]
1. During the POM period of November and October 1984, the
following statistics apply:
Man hours expended : 252.30 hrs.
Parts expenditure: $3,425.98
Turn in cost of repaired cards: $162,066.07
Savings: $158,665.21
Number of jobs: 71
2. During the deployment, the following statistics apply:
Man hours expended: 8 52.00 hrs.
Parts expenditure: $7,507.23
Turn in cost of repaired cards: $258,094.43
Savings: $251,214.97
Number of jobs: 236
3
.
The average turn-around time for equipment brought to
2M for repair follows:
Component replacement only: 1.5 hrs.
PCB repair: 36.0 hrs.
Local manufacture (Cables, etc): 48.0 hrs.
B. NO EVIDENCE OF FAILURE TESTING
Testing for NEOF among repairables started in 1978
under STEEP. "In the first 15 months of the program, 75
percent of all EM/PCBs sent to SIMAs for repair were found
to have no defects." [Ref. 4: p. 5] A NAVSEA funded
investigation of NEOF for fleet level turn-ins of PCBs
conducted by Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach noted that
"...Based on an average "net" cost of $873 for each board
and an average NFE rate of 38% the resulting annual OPTAR
cost to the Navy, due to NFE boards, is $10,615,000.00."
[Ref. 6: p. 1] A further review showed that many of the
items subject to NEOF were not covered by this study.
"Therefore, a more realistic figure for NFE cost would be
18
three times higher or in excess of $30,000,000.00 per
year." [Ref. 6:p. 1]
Two more recent studies conducted by SIMA San Diego
gave the results displayed in Tables 4 and 5.
TABLE 4. NEOF RESULTS FROM AUGUST 1987 TEST [Ref. 7:p. 1]
Total Condition Condition NEOF
NSN Tested "A" up ii Rate
5895-00-395-0292 2 1 1 50%
5895-00-395-0295 13 6 7 46%
5895-00-412-8615 29 21 8 72%
5895-00-412-8618 1 1 0%
5895-00-395-8620 13 7 6 54%
5895-00-535-8247 10 6 4 60%
5999-01-042-3396 25 11 14 44%
5840-01-084-8764 7 2 5 29%
Totals 100 54 46 54%
Total Condition Condition NEOF
Tested "A" iipii Rate
2 2 100%
8 4 4 50%
18 14 4 78%
30 4 26 13%
58 24 34 41%







SIMA San Diego estimates that $21,063.00 from the first
test and an additional $6,348.00 from the second test could
have been saved by ship OPTAR holders if the material had
been screened prior to being turned in for repair. During
the December 1987 test, SIMA San Diego also conducted
repairs on NSNs 5845-00-450-1851 and 5825-00-321-0671
resulting in an additional savings of approximately
$10,486.76. The test cost data follows in Table 6.
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TABLE 6. REPAIR COSTS AT SIMA SAN DIEGO [Ref. 8: p. 1]
NSN No. "F" No. Repaired Total Parts
Cost
5845-00-450-1851 4 4 $37.92
5825-00-321-0671 26 17 $39.32
Total Cost $77.24
In August 1987, NAVSEACOMSYSENGSTA Norfolk, Virginia
reported that average 2M repair actions totaled $243.91.
"Supply cost and labor cost are based on standardized
costing factors. Supply cost is based on $60.24 per
requisition or supply actio. The supply cost for the
typical 2M action is based on an average of one
requisition, therefore the typical supply cost is $60.24.
Labor cost is based on $13.48 per man-hour. For the typical
2M action the labor cost is the 11.9 M-H average labor per
2M action times $13.48 which is $160.41." [Ref. 5:p. 9]
"...A conservative estimate is a savings per 2M action of
approximately five times the cost calculated per 2M action.
A more significant advantage of the 2M repair is the
ability to repair items and return a system to service
expeditiously when otherwise there would have been a delay
awaiting parts." [Ref. 5: p. 10]
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In order to run a regression analysis, one must have at
least two sets of data which can be correlated against each
other. Appendix F lists the ten NSNs which comprise the
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original pool from which the two NSNs for the regression
analysis were chosen. Each DLR data base contains five main
sets of data which were considered as possibilities for the
independent and dependent variables required to conduct a
regression analysis. These data sets are:
1. Standard price. The standard price is the price
which SPCC considers as its replacement cost. It is
based on the latest price paid for a new unit plus a
surcharge. Unfortunately, new orders are not
performed every year so the standard price at times
is based on pricing which may be several years old.
This causes a problem for SPCC when commands who
order DLRs without a carcass turn-in are charged the
standard price and this price is not sufficient to
cover the cost of a new item or it is discovered to
have been too high of a replacement price estimate.
2. Repair price. There are two types of repair pricing
used at SPCC today. The first is the historical
price which is the cost of the last repair action to
be made on a DLR. The second is the current repair
price which SPCC would currently have to pay for
repairs on the item today. It is this second type of
repair pricing which is used for the regression
analysis.
3. Net price. The net price of an item is based on the
historical cost to repair the item plus a surcharge.
The repair cost figure, however, is once again the
cost of the last repair action performed on that
NSN. This, too, has caused problems for SPCC.
4. Demand quantity. The demand quantity is the
historical number of items requisitioned by end
users of an item. This figure can be unduly affected
by either the fact that an item has a high NEOF rate
or by the fact that it is a progressive DLR and has
a high IMA repair accomplish rate. In either case,
the demand quantity registered by SPCC can be in
error. A high NEOF rate causes an inflated demand
reading, and a high IMA repair accomplishment rate
on progressive DLRs can rob SPCC's data base of
demand information. This is because at present SPCC
can only use procurement data to determine demand
from the fleet. Chapter five of this paper will
discuss a possible solution to this problem.
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5. Repair quantity. Repair quantity is the number of
items which are repaired during a period of time.
Here, too, there have been some problems. SPCC does
not repair the same number of items each year as
have been ordered and turned in. Instead, a
complicated math model is used to forecast the
quantity of an item which will be required, and
repairs and reorders are based on this quantity. Any
remaining Not Ready For Issue (NRFI) carcasses are
stored until required for repair processing.
The items considered as eligible for the regression
analysis were limited to those items selected by SIMA San
Diego for their two repair tests in August and December of
1987. All pertinent information on these items is listed in
Appendix F. As discussed earlier, IMAs are supposed to
possess repair capability for progressive repairables, and
as a result progressive DLRs were eliminated from the pool
of items available for analysis. Therefore, the items
considered as eligible were those which were SM&R coded as
depot/depot repairables and had a proven repair capability
by SIMA San Diego. The two NSNs 5845-00-450-1852 and 5825-
00-321-0671 fit the above requirements. Both of these items
are coded as depot/depot level repairables, and both had
been repaired by SIMA San Diego during their December 1987
test.
With the NSNs selected, only the independent and
dependent variables were left to select. For the purpose of
the regression analysis, the yearly net pricing and depot
repair pricing for the two NSNs were chosen as the
dependent and independent variables respectively. The
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reasoning behind this is that net pricing is built upon the
repair pricing plus a surcharge. Therefore, a positive
correlation was expected. The data used for both items in
the regression analysis are displayed in Tables 7 and 8,
and the findings of the regression analyses are shown in
Table 9 on the following page.
TABLE 7. REGRESSION ANALYSIS DATA NSN 5845-00-450-1852





TABLE 8. REGRESSION ANALYSIS DATA NSN 5825-00-321-0671





TABLE 9. REGRESSION ANALYSES RESULTS
For NSN 5845-00-450-1852
Constant 1,042.549
Std Err of Y Est 202.377
r 2 (Coefficient of Determination) 0.22337511
r (Coefficient of Correlation) - 0.4726258
No. of Observations 4
Degrees of Freedom 2




Std Err of Y Est 88.06084
r2 (Coefficient of Determination) 0.1182317
r (Coefficient of Correlation) - 0.3438483
No. of Observations 4
Degrees of Freedom 2
X Coefficient (s) Std Err of Coef.
- 0.67202 1.297716
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Note that the Coefficients of Correlation for both NSNs
are (-.47) and (-.34) respectively. The fact that both NSNs
have negative Coefficients of Correlation means that as
their depot repair prices have increased, their net prices
have decreased. The Coefficient of Determination for NSN
5845-00-450-1852 shows that only 22.34% of the variation in
price for a depot repair can be explained by the different
net prices charged to the fleet each year, and for NSN
5825-00-321-0671 only 11.82% of the change in the net
price can be explained by the movement in the NSN's repair
pricing.
With such poor correlation between their net and repair
prices, the regression formulas for these two NSNs will not
give very accurate predictions for future prices. A
discussion with personnel in the contracting and pricing
departments at SPCC shed the following light on the above
findings:
1. The standard price charged to customers is based on
the most recent purchase price paid for a new item.
2. The net price, however, is based on the historical
price for repair of the NSN plus a surcharge. In
many cases, this price may be very old or come from
several different repair sources, and because of
their different methods of billing for repairs it is
often difficult for SPCC to have a set repair price
on which to base an item's net price.
3
.
The repair contract types used at SPCC include
unpriced orders, Firm Fixed Priced (FFP) orders, and
Cost Plus Profit (CPP) contracts. Any combination of
these may be used on an NSN during its life cycle.
Therefore, the prices stated are most often
estimates of what a repair is expected to cost.
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With the above in mind, it is now evident that little
if any information can be derived from performing a
regression analysis using pricing information from SPCC's
data base. The negative correlation, however, was
unexpected and a discussion with SPCC personnel showed this
to be irregular. A positive correlation should always exist
between the net pricing and the repair pricing for an item,
since the repair pricing plus a surcharge is the basis for
the net pricing. Further investigation, however, with SPCC
pricing specialists led to the possible explanation of part
of this negative trend due to the varying of the yearly
surcharge charged to SPCC customers. In fact, the surcharge
has fallen almost every year since 1985. The surcharges are
listed in Table 10 below. It was also discovered for NSN
5845-00-450-1852 that the net pricing has been developed
from both commercial and organic depot repair pricing.
Further, the commercial depot used CPP, and the organic
depot used FFP contracting. In fact, the only repair
pricing variance which SPCC looks for is a variance between
SPCC's most current historical repair price and the current
net price. This once a year report is called the "Repair
History File." [Ref. 17]
TABLE 10: YEARLY SURCHARGE RATES






One reason for the fall in the surcharge rates has been
the improvement in the contracting techniques in the
military. These newer methods have lessened the variance
observed from year to year in the price paid for purchases
of new material and for repairs to older material. Another
cost which has decreased in the past few years is that of
inflation. This has also helped reduce the cost of
conducting business for the military.
Problems, however, still exist in the way business is
currently conducted at SPCC. If current work conference
pricing were used as the basis for the current net pricing,
less impact would be felt by the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) when
repair orders are placed by SPCC's item managers. There
should also be review of the base replacement price when
the old one is two or more years old. The following
information is connected with the current pricing of NSN
4845-00-450-1852.
1. Current net pricing - $108
2. Historical repair price - two in 1986 from a
commercial depot for $68 and $128
3. Current work conference repair pricing - $400 for
repair at an organic repair depot as a FFP contract.
4. Current standard price - $323
5. Historical replacement pricing - $265 based on an
order for 35 in 1985.
6. Current replacement cost estimate - $500 to $700
depending on the number ordered.
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If this NSN were repaired today, a deficit of $292.00
would be charged to the NSF. If the same NSN was reordered,
the NSF would also take a loss. Current pricing policy at
SPCC does not allow charges to the fleet to reflect the
current cost of repair or replacement. Instead, the
surcharge is used as a buffer between what is really
required and what is charged to fleet customers. A change
to the pricing policy, therefore, would be most beneficial.
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IV. LEVEL OF REPAIR ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is part of every
major system acquisition performed by the Navy today. The
ultimate goal of the ILS is to make certain that proper
support is available for a system when it is deployed. One
of the main programs in this effort is the LSA. The LSA
ensures that the overall program objectives are cost
effective. The selection of the method for handling a new
or already deployed system over its expected or remaining
life is performed by the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA)
.
As stated in Chapter 2, a LORA is a trade-off analysis
undertaken as part of the LSA to determine the least cost
method of maintaining an item over its life cycle. This
idea of developing a Life Cycle Cost (LCC) for an item is
an important part in maximizing fleet readiness while
ensuring that limited defense funding is spent in the most
effective manner. LORAs are normally run on items when they
first enter into service or when an interested party
suspects that a change should be made in how an item is
presently handled. The most important outcome of the LORA
is the assignment of the SM&R codes. This SM&R code will
guide the support chain's handling of the item over the
items's Life Cycle (LC)
.
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B. NAVSEA'S LORA MODEL
The LORA models used today are basically of two types.
The first uses a mathematical model and economic factors
such as those listed in Table 11 to determine the least
cost method of handling an item over its LC.
TABLE 11. BASIC COST CATEGORIES FOR ECONOMIC
LEVEL OF REPAIR MODELS [Ref. 9: p. III-ll]
A. Life Cycle
1. Inventory





















H. Field Supply Administration
I. Inflation/Discount
The second method of analysis uses non-economic factors
to determine the best way to manage an item over its LC.
Table 12 shows six exception criteria used by MIL-STD-13 09B
in deciding whether or not to categorize an item as a DLR.
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The first four criteria are reasons to change an item from
a NON-DLR to DLR, and the last two are reasons to change an
item from a DLR to either a Consumable or a FLR.
TABLE 12. LORA EXCEPTION CRITERIA [Ref. 9:pp. III-9/10]
A. No Source of Procurement
B. Interservice Agreement
C. Maintaining Manufacturing Repair/Production for
Mobilization
D. Deferred Support Decisions
E. No Identifiable Depot Overhaul Point (DOP) -
Technical Skill Requirements
F. No Identifiable DOP - Structural Considerations
NAVSEA presently has two LORA computer models. The
first of these models is the Level III analysis. The second
is the VAX/PLI MOD V. Both models are used for LORAs, but
the Level III model, which is the older of the two, is
predominantly used for analysis of existing items, and is
designed to run on a Texas Instrument (TI) programmable
calculator. The MOD V model is much more complex. Its
programing requires that it be run on a mainframe computer.
The complexity of the output is different for both
programs. The Level III offers one option at a time while
the MOD V can list several different options in a single
program run. For the purpose of the LORA for this paper,
the Level III model was chosen. The Level III model will be
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used to determine if the economic factors today show that
the two NSNs should migrate from the DLR to NON-DLR
management.
As mentioned earlier, there are two types of criteria
used when performing a LORA. The Level III model uses
economic "...factors of varying significance. . .to calculate
the cost to the Navy of each LOR alternative." [Ref. 13: p.
1-3] Economic factors such as those listed in Table 11
above will be used by the Level III model to analyze the
costs connected with continuing a particular management
policy and the cost of changing to a new management policy.
The output figures show the user what additional costs
would be incurred by either changing or continuing an
item's present maintenance classification. The LORA output
does not include sunk costs and therefore should not be
considered as a total LCC estimate. Instead, the LCC
estimates should be viewed as incremental costs.
The items chosen for the LORA were the same two NSNs
used for the regression analysis in Chapter III. This
decision was made first because both items are presently
coded as depot/depot level repairable even though they are
listed in reference 10 as items capable of being screened
by both the organizational and intermediate levels. The
second reason for choosing these items is that one in
particular, NSN 5845-00-450-1852, has a standard price of
$323.00 and a repair price of $400.00. The above pricing
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seems to support the possible categorization of that NSN as
a FLR instead of a DLR. The final reason for choosing
these two items is that both have proven to be repairable
at the intermediate level.
C. LEVEL OF REPAIR ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In order to properly run a LORA, information must be
gathered from many sources. The NAVSEA LORA LEVEL III




One or more points of contact from the manufacturer
3. Technical manuals for the assembly
4 Table of shipping costs
5. One or more contacts on the Navy project office
6. A copy of Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD)
Since this great preponderance of material was not directly
available, information for the LORA was obtained from the
item's manager, the program manager, the repair depot, the
In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA) , and the Naval
Material Transportation Office (NAVEMTO)
.
Tables 13 and 14 list the economic factors to be
analyzed by the Level III LORA. The data is read in two
parts with the centerline decimal point being the dividing
point. Therefore, the first line of Table 13 would be read
as "Total Equipment Population" 121, and "Installed
Equipment Last Two Years" is also 121.
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% S&TE DED, O-LEVEL
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PRODUCTION LEAD TIME 104.86
DEPOT REPAIR TAT WKS 12.0400





INSTALLED LAST 2 YRS
1-WAY SHIPPING COST








MH FOR O/I REPAIRS
% S&TE DED, O-LEVEL
% S&TE DED, I-LEVEL
% S&TE DED, D-LEVEL
For the purpose of this paper, the Level III analysis
of DLR versus Non-DLR for existing items was chosen. The
Level III model makes all required calculations for the
cost comparison between the NON-DLR and DLR alternatives.
Tables 15 and 16 on the following page list the results of
the initial run though the Level III model.
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TABLE 15. SUMMARY OF INITIAL OUTPUT STATISTICS
FOR NSN 5825-00-321-0671
NON-DLR DLR
Total Life Cycle Cost : 116,339,581. 40,292,439.
Item Entry, PTD, Repair Doc: 208. 0.
Supply Management : 420,863. 1,262,053.
Allowance : 0. 0.
Initial System Stock : 4,905,600. 0.
Replenishment : 111,012,910. 8,983,164.
Repair, Shipping, S&TE : 30,047,222.
TABLE 16. SUMMARY OF INITIAL OUTPUT STATISTICS
FOR NSN 5845-00-450-1852
NON-DLR DLR
Total Life Cycle Cost : 125,736,034. 162,313,695.
Item Entry, PTD, Repair Doc: 208. 0.
Supply Management : 2,648,902. 7,974,098.
Allowance : 0. 0.
Initial System Stock : 4,180,589. 0.
Replenishment : 118,906,335. 31,985,804.
Repair, Shipping, S&TE : 122,353,793.
The initial LORA results for NSN 5825-00-321-0671 show
that it would cost an additional $40,292,439 to manage it
as a DLR and an additional $116,339,581 for management as a
NON-DLR. In such a case, the material should continue to be
handled as a DLR. For NSN 5845-00-450-1852, additional
costs of $162,313,695 and $125,736,034 would be incurred to
handle the item as either a DLR or NON-DLR respectively.
Since NSN 5845-00-450-1852 costs more to manage as a DLR
than to reclassify the item as a NON-DLR, it appears that
its management classification should be changed from DLR to
NON-DLR. However, one should not take these results and
immediately make a change in how an item is handled. The
initial results should be subjected to sensitivity analysis
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to determine how much of a change would be required to
change the initial findings. Further, it is important to
note where the main costs are for each of the two
alternatives. The main cost for the NON-DLR alternative is
the cost of replenishing the item over its LC and the
additional cost of purchasing initial system stock. These
costs are controlled by two main items, namely the
availability of the material and the replacement cost over
the system's expected life.
To discover how the LORA Model reacts to changes in the
replacement cost for each NSN, several sensitivity analyses
were performed on each NSN. A sensitivity analysis
manipulates certain inputs from the original data while
holding all other inputs constant in order to determine the
effect on the original solution. The first of these
sensitivity analyses are displayed in Tables 17 and 18 on
the following page. The purpose of these first analyses is
to see how changes in replacement price of an item affects
the overall LCC of the NON-DLR and DLR alternatives.











ASSEMB1^Y REPAIR AS NON-DLR
COST A % OF COST Added LCC
$1,920.,00 26.8% $116,339,581.
$1,030.,00 50.0% $ 62,606,522.
$ 572.,00 90.0% $ 34,955,127.
$ 560,,00 92.0% $ 34,230,636.
$ 557,,00 92.5% $ 34,049,513.
$ 555,.00 92.8% $ 33,928,765.
$ 554,.00 92.96% $ 33,868,391.
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TABLE 18. EFFECT OF ASSEMBLY COST ON LIFE CYCLE COST
FOR NSN 5845-00-450-1852
ASSEMBLY REPAIR AS NON-DLR DLR
COST A % OF COST Added LCC Added LCC
$779.00 51.4% $299,505,809. $207,470,124
$595.00 67.2% $229,388,180. $189,249,109
$533.00 75.0% $205,761,588. $183,109,419
$453.00 88.3% $175,275,662. $175,187,238
$452.00 88.5% $174,894,588. $175,088,211
$451.00 88.7% $174,513,514. $174,989,184
$323.00 123.8% $125,736,034. $162,313,695
As the cost of repair becomes a higher percentage of the
total cost of replacing the assembly, the easier it is to
make a decision to declare an item either a NON-DLR or a
DLR. One can also note that although the above holds true
for both items, the changeover occurs at different
percentage amounts for the two items. This is mainly due to
the differences in the cost of support and test equipment
costs for repair of each item and its Depot Survival Rate
(DSR) . The DSR for an NSN is the percentage of items that
is expected to survive the depot repair process. As can be
noted from the input data, NSN 5825-00-321-0671 had a DSR
of 99.99%, and NSN 5845-00-450-1852 had only a 85% DSR. To
see how the DSR might affect the overall LCC of each NSN,
sensitivity analyses were run for each NSN varying the DSR
while keeping all remaining data inputs constant. The
results are shown below in Tables 19 and 20. Note the
difference in the way a change in the DSR affects the LCC
of each NSN.
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TABLE 19. DEPOT SURVIVAL RATE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
FOR NSN 5825-00-321-0671
Depot NON-DLR DLR
Survival Rate Added LCC Added LCC
99.9% $116,339,581. $ 40,292,439
90.0% $115,853,821. $ 47,559,760
80.0% $115,362,301. $ 54,900,489
70.0% $114,870,781. $ 62,241,218
50.0% $113,889,661. $ 76,922,675
30.0% $112,906,621. $ 91,604,133
0.0% $111,433,981. $112,343,968
Depot NON-DLR



















For NSN 5825-00-321-0671, the sensitivity analyses results
for changes in the DSR show an increase in the cost of the
DLR alternative, while the cost of the NON-DLR alternative
decreased. For NSN 5845-00-450-1852, the effect was just
the opposite for the DLR alternative. This occurrence can
be explained by the differences in the cost to replace and
repair each NSN. For the first NSN, it is less expensive to
repair than to replace. Therefore, as the DSR decreases and
more items are required to be replaced at the depot level,
a larger system inventory must be carried. This in turn
results in a requirement to purchase less initial stock
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when considering a switch to the NON-DLR alternative, thus
reducing the cost of the NON-DLR alternative. Conversely,
the second NSN shows opposite results for the DLR
alternative. This is because its replacement price is
cheaper than its repair price. As the DSR falls and more
items fail depot repair, it is less costly to replace them.
This reduces the cost of the DLR alternative. As with the
first NSN, however, the decrease in cost for the NON-DLR
alternative is due to the reduced need for added initial
stock. This is a result of the increased need for system
stock at the depot because of the lower DSR.
Another variable which affects the LCC of an item is its
annual replacement rate. The annual replacement rate used
for the LORA was the average demand per year as carried by
SPCC's data base. The LCC is not as sensitive to a change
in the annual replacement rate as it was for the
replacement price of the item. This is because the
replacement rate only affects the number of items which
will need to be procured over the LC of the item and not
the cost of these items. Therefore, although the total cost
is dropping, the cost difference between the item's
replacement cost and its repair cost is still the main
driving force for the LCC until demand becomes extremely
small. At this point, the inherent cost to repair takes
over and make the repair option more expensive. The results
are shown below in Tables 21 and in Table 22.
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TABLE 21. EFFECT OF ANNUAL REPLACEMENT RATE ON LIFE CYCLE

















TABLE 22. EFFECT OF ANNUAL REPLACEMENT RATE ON LIFE CYCLE















It is important to investigate the cost of Procurement
Leadtime (PLT) and Repair Turnaround Time (RTAT) on an
item's LCC. Tables 2 3 and 2 4 display the results of the PLT
sensitivity analyses, and Tables 25 and 26 display the
































































































In both sets of analyses, only the NON-DLR alternative's
cost was affected. This results because the Level III model
only displays the incremental cost of the change between
the two alternatives and not the total cost of the change.
Both PLT and RTAT changes affect only the quantity of
initial system stock required for a change to the NON-DLR
alternative. As PLT is increased, the additional system
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stock held for the DLR alternative is considered a sunk
cost by the model and only the added cost of additional
system stock for the NON-DLR alternative is reflected.
Conversely, a change in the RTAT has the opposite effect on
the two NSNs. A decrease in RTAT results in less system
stock being held for the DLR alternative, thereby
increasing the number of initial system spares required to
be purchased in order to switch to the NON-DLR alternative.
An increase in RTAT results in an increased need for
pipeline inventory which reduces the number of initial
system spares required for a switch to the NON-DLR
alternative.
Both of the NSNs dealt with here require SM&R changes
to reflect that they are in fact progressive level DLRs.
The LORA results, however, show that NSN 5825-00-321-0671
should remain presently as a DLR. NSN 5845-00-450-1852,
however, requires additional research before it is moved
from the ranks of DLRs to FLRs. The additional questions
needing to be addressed are:
1. What is the current replacement price for the item?
2. Is the item still available for procurement?
3. Do the IMAs have full screening and fault isolation
capability on this NSN?
These questions must be answered before any change can be
suggested to the Hardware Systems Command (HSC) . The LORA
only suggests items worthy of additional research.
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V. 3-M AND ENSURING REQUIREMENT JUSTIFICATION
A. BACKGROUND
Ship's Maintenance and Material Management (3-M) system
began in 1965, the year after the Aviation 3-M system was
implemented. Both 3-M systems are part of the overall
Integrated Logistics Support System (ILSS) which has been
installed by the Navy as "...a management tool designed to
provide efficient, uniform methods of conducting and
recording preventative and corrective maintenance in a way
that allows fast and easy access to the collected data."
[Ref. 14:p. 2-2]
Two main subsystems of the 3-M system are the Planned
Maintenance System (PMS) and Maintenance Data System (MDS)
.
PMS is "...concerned with preventive maintenance, and MDS
is concerned with the collection of corrective maintenance
and configuration data." [Ref. 14: p. 2-2]
MDS is of significant importance to the Navy's ILSS.
MDS is the primary method whereby all data concerning
corrective maintenance and configuration changes are
collected into a computerized data base for the purposes of
analysis, maintenance and configuration tracking, and
maintenance forecasting. All 3-M data is passed either
directly or indirectly to the Fleet Analysis Center (FLTAC)
located in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The FLTAC, also
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known as the Navy Maintenance Support Office (NAMSO)
, has
recently been reorganized and absorbed by the Naval Sea
Logistics Center (NAVSEALOGCEN) which acts as SPCC's In-
service Engineering Activity (ISEA) , and is the repository
for all shipboard 3-M data.
SPCC is faced with certain problems when using the
information available from NAVSEALOGCEN. Presently, there
are two very different types of 3-M data being collected by
the Navy's 3-M system. Part of the information comes in the
form of 3-M procurement documentation for ships performing
both preventive and repair maintenance on shipboard
systems. The second involves pure maintenance data
pertaining to repairs performed without need for the
requisitioning of a repairable end item. The main problem
for SPCC comes from the fact that only 3-M procurement
information can provide the piece/part information required
to forecast future demand and procurement quantities
accurately. This piece/part information comes in the form
of NSNs, circuit symbol numbers, or manufacturer's part
numbers. Conversely, pure maintenance data provides only
equipment data and no piece/part information. This
information is used by the ISEA for keeping track of system
configuration and maintenance factors for systems as a
whole, but provides nothing from which SPCC's present
inventory models can predict usage demand. However, not all
SPCC procurement actions are affected by present 3-M
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documentation. The present methods work well for SPCC's
present consumable and FLR models as both are considered
expended by SPCC when issued. However, DLRs provide SPCC
with a completely different set of problems. In order to
manage DLRs, SPCC must be able to accurately know demand,
Repair Survival Rates (RSR) , Procurement Leadtime (PLT)
,
and RTAT for DLRs. For DLRs which are managed completely
from the depot level, there is no problem with collecting
the above information. For DLRs which are handled as
progressive repairables, however, SPCC is unable to collect
accurate procurement information. This problem is due to
SPCC's inability to use 3-M maintenance documentation for
anything other than overall system status. The loss of this
information can adversely affect the quantity stocked of an
item by SPCC. This occurs because 3-M procurement data is
exchanged for 3-M maintenance data which is unable to
provide the required piece/part information concerning a
maintenance action.
As STEEP has gained momentum and more ATEs have been
added to the fleet, the number of NSNs coded as progressive
DLRs has steadily risen. Today approximately 88 percent of
all DLRs are SM&R coded as progressive DLRs. The loss of
procurement information to SPCC is at present negligible.
This, however, is due mainly because many items are now
being forwarded to repair depots prior to exhausting the
NSN's progressive options of organizational and
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intermediate level screenings and repairs. The present
problem of NEOF points to this. However, as the Fleet
CINCs' resolve to end this problem increases, more 3-M
procurement data will be lost to SPCC's inventory data
base. At the same time, additional information concerning
3-M maintenance actions from both the organizational and
intermediate levels will be provided to a system unable to
use it.
The problem for SPCC is finding a way of overcoming the
loss of its procurement information on material which is
categorized as a progressive DLR. The easiest solution to
this problem would be for SPCC to use the 3-M data
currently available for all maintenance actions performed
on a system. Unfortunately, present shipboard 3-M
maintenance documentation is tied strictly to equipment
nomenclature and rarely, if ever, lists piece/part
information. Therefore, the data available to SPCC is of no
value since its data base uses only historical NSN
procurement demands to forecast future demand. This is
exemplified in a case in which a circuit card in system A
fails, and the circuit card has a 7HH COG and MCC. There
are presently two options for the handling of this item.
Both options require the knowledge of the item's SM&R
coding. In one case, the item is coded as a fourth and
fifth digit SM&R coding of DD. This item is a plain DLR
and is to be immediately procured when a failure is noted.
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No repair is authorized below the depot level. Therefore,
no effect on SPCC's data base for usage is noted, in
another case, the item has the same COG and MCC of 7HH, but
the fourth and fifth positions of its SM&R code are now GD.
In such cases, the item is known as a progressive DLR, and
depending on abilities at the organizational and
intermediate levels, both screening and repairs are
possible. If repairs are made either by the shipboard
repair technician or the IMA, only 3-M maintenance
documentation will be available, and SPCC will lose
demand/ failure information on this item. The loss of such
information will appear as a reduction in the demand for
this item, but in fact the demand still exists. Only the
documentation has changed. If enough such cases occurred,
an item could see its inventory levels reduced as SPCC's
computer based model adjusts itself for the loss of
procurement information on an item.
In the above two cases, 3-M documentation was
available, but only the procurement format provided the
piece/part information required by SPCC's data base. If the
maintenance documentation carried piece/part information,
SPCC would be able to draw this information from the MDS
data base and substitute it for the lost procurement
documentation
.
The present Shipboard Maintenance Action Form OPNAV
4790/2K is displayed in Figure 3 on page 48. Note that the
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identifying information section only requires system
information and not any piece/part information.
Conversely, in the aviation community, the main
maintenance action form is the Visual Information Display
System/Maintenance Action Form (VIDS/MAF) shown in Figure 4
on page 49. The VIDS/MAF "...is used by supported
maintenance and supply activities to request work or
assistance from the supporting IMA that is beyond the
requesting activity's capability and does not involve
repair of aeronautical equipment." [Ref. 15:p. 6-36] Note
that in blocks 14, 19 and 34 of the Failed/Required
material section of the VIDS/MAF, piece/part information
and not system information is used. This allows the
aviation MDS access to information relating to parts
failure and repair rates at the organizational level and
gives ASO a clearer picture of end user requirements.
The Work Request Customer Service OPNAV 4790/36A, shown
in Figure 5 on page 50, is used by the IMA when requesting
assistance from depots "...to complete components delayed
due to lack of facilities for check and test, or for
processing not normally required..." [Ref. 16:p. 8-23] or
performed at the IMA. Note that on this form piece/part
information is also included.
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B. USES OF 3-M DOCUMENTATION
If the OPNAV 4790/2K were to be changed so that
piece/part information could be used along with system
information, SPCC's data base dealing with parts, usage
would be significantly enhanced. Ships with ATEs would be
required to forward a copy of the ATE s readout along with
the 2-Kilo repair document to the IMA. If repairs were
accomplished at the IMA, the PCB would be returned to the
command and the completed 3-M action would find its way
into SPCC's MDS files at NAVSEALOGCEN.
In cases where the IMA could not repair the DLR, the
carcass would be returned to the command for turn-in
through the normal channels. However, the 2-kilo document
accompanying the carcass would now reflect screening by the
IMA prior to it being forwarded to the depot for repairs or
condemnation. In the case of a FLR, the IMA would condemn
the item if not repairable and inform the command to
reorder the part through normal supply channels. In both
cases, OPTAR funding would be saved because of the
screening of the material prior to turn-in, disposal, or
reorder.
In a system such as above, the 3-M system would not be
changed significantly at the field level. Instead, the
majority of the changes would be felt at the ICP level
where there would be information available from
NAVSEALOGCEN ' s MDS data base concerning piece/part failure
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and repair rates from the field and intermediate levels.
Such a file could be queried to supply the numbers of NSNs
repaired by IMAs. Just as today, shipboard repair actions
could be tracked in the form of the Job Control Numbers
(JCNs) and these same JCNs would be included as part of the
parts requisitioning process. This would allow SPCC to
exclude those repairs which ended in condemnations and were
finally requisitioned.
Changing the shipboard 3-M system to reflect piece/part
information makes dollar sense today. The changes required
are few, but the added tracking ability would allow SPCC to
manage its inventory of DLRs and FLRs more closely. The use
of 3-M documentation could also help reduce inventory
quantities held by SPCC as safety stock by increasing the
data base used for forecasting demand on repairables.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. GENERAL COMMENTS
This thesis has covered some of the areas which could
help the Navy save operational funding while still keeping
its operational availability goals intact. As the Defense
Department's budget is reduced further in upcoming years
and the Navy's share decreases, the operational CINCs will
find it increasingly hard to accomplish their missions with
less Operation and Maintenance Navy (O&MN) money to spend
each year. The apparent loss of operational funding due to
NEOF will force the CINCs to allow their repair technicians
to try to repair all items at the organizational and
intermediate levels. This will result in more problems than
solutions. Repair technicians do not have the equipment and
training to repair all items presently deployed in the
fleet, but they do have more ability than what is currently
being credited to them. Although no one solution is all
encompassing, a good starting point would be to stop the
syphoning off of the CINCs' O&MN dollars to the Navy Stock
Fund (NSF) by NEOF among DLRs and FLRs.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to stop this flow of funding and correct the
problem of NEOF among repairables, several steps must be
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taken. The following is a list of five actions which, if
correctly implemented, would correct the problem of NEOF
among repairables as well as save O&MN funding for the
operational CINCs.
1. Stock Number Groupings
Presently NSNs are grouped into three main
categories. These groupings include consumables, FLRs and
DLRs. The first recommendation concerns the segregation of
all stock numbers into five areas according to their SM&R
coding. The first of these areas would be pure depot level
repairables. This group should include all items coded for
no repair authorized below the depot level according to
their SM&R coding. The second grouping would be progressive
repairables. This group should have new COGs assigned.
Possibly a 5H or 5G COG would be a good choice. The third
grouping would be progressive FLRs. At present, only 89
items have been listed as 3H COG material by SPCC. As
mentioned in chapter three, there are presently over 89,000
items SM&R coded as progressive FLRs. SPCC is presently
trying to have the HSCs reverify SM&R coding prior to any
COG reassignment. What should occur is the immediate COG
migration for all items presently SM&R coded as a
progressive FLR. This action could be followed by a
reverification of those items suspected of being SM&R coded
in error. The reason for this is that each day that these
items do not have their COGs changed, money will be wasted
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because of improper handling of these items. The fourth
grouping would be 1HD FLRs which will actually become
organizational level repairables. Although theses FLRs will
have condemnation authority at the organizational, level,
many of these items could still be repaired by IMAs when
the shipboard technician is unable to make corrections.
Therefore, care must be taken in the writing of disposition
instructions for all FLRs. The fifth and final grouping
would be pure consumable items.
2. ATE and 2M Deployment
The second recommendation involves the present
deployment of ATEs and 2M capability to the fleet. At
present, 2M stations are granted prior to ATEs because of
cost. It is also not mandatory at this time for a ship to
have personnel assigned with any of the four 2M repair
NECs. Consequently, a ship which has the more expensive ATE
may or may not have someone onboard who carries the proper
NEC to handle the equipment. One recommendation would be
that the ships which are on the list to receive ATEs or 2M
stations or who already have one or the other should have
2M NECs added to their list of required NECs. Further,
attention should be paid to the importance of having all
senior repair technicians for all ships trained in 2M
capability as they will eventually be transferred, and
their training can be utilized elsewhere.
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3. Which Items to Screen
A third recommendation concerns determining on which
pieces of equipment should money be spent to obtain either
screening or fault isolation TPSs capability. Realizing
that money is a scarce resource, every dollar spent on
repair capability must be maximized. In purchasing
screening or fault isolation capability, three concerns
should be taken into account. The first is the demand for
the item. If the item only fails once or twice a year, it
may be less costly to stock a spare and repair the item at
the IMA or depot level. The LORA can help determine this
through a simple cost analysis. The second concern is the
complexity of the item. If the item is very complex, the
cost for the TPS will be more expensive. Another concern is
if the repair capability of the personnel is adequate at
the fleet level. This decision should be made by the HSC as
part of the LSA during the equipment's prototyping and
designing phases. The final aspect concerns whether or not
the item should be a repairable. This, too, can be handled
by the LORA. This cost analysis will determine if an item
is worth repairing. It is important that the LORA is not
just a one time exercise. It should be calculated every few
years or whenever technology has made it economically
possible to repair an item at a lower level.
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4. Parts Availability
One recurrent problem concerns the availability of
repair parts for repairables. It seems that although
standardization policies have been enacted, systems are
being brought on-line with modifications which make them
nonstandard in nature. These changes are made in the name
of cost savings and deadline meeting, but if the true cost
of carrying these new lines of repair parts was considered,
it would soon be apparent that nonstandard equipment is not
cost effective in the long run. One panacea in this concern
is that the Program Manager (PM) not be allowed to make
changes to system design when these changes involve
nonstandard equipment substitutions. These decisions should
be made by the HSC which is more concerned with the entire
LC of the system and not just the deployment of a system
ahead of schedule and under cost.
5. Uses of 3-M Dnmim*>nl-.ation
The final recommendation concerns the present 3-M
capability for surface forces. It is recommended that
changes be implemented that would add piece/part
information to SPCC's MDS data base. The information
available on failure and repairs at the organizational and
intermediate levels would help SPCC better forecast demand
for progressive field level and depot level repairables.
The cost savings would come in the form of possible
inventory reductions and even more so in the form of
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increased Ao. As SPCC does a better job of carrying the
material requested by the fleet in the correct amounts,
less shortages will be noted and repairs will be made
without the dreaded awaiting parts syndrome.
C. CONCLUSION
All activities in the Navy must do their part in order
for any savings to be made. Partial or slow implementation
by any one activity only adds to the waste, and it costs
additional dollars. One final item that must be stressed is
that training must also be accomplished. This training must
reach not only the supply personnel but the repair
technicians as well.
In summary, if all activities in the Navy do their part
in correcting the NEOF problem, operational funding can be
saved for its intended use of repairing downed equipment.
The funding saved and the decreased repairable RTAT will
allow the operational CINCs to further enhance their Ao and
repair additional downed systems without additional
funding. These repaired systems may be what is required in
time of need to save lives.
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND MEANINGS
ATAC Advance Tracking and Control
ATE Automatic Testing Equipment
BOA Basic Ordering Agreement
CASREP Casualty Report
CINC Commander in Chief
COG Cognizance
COMNAVAIRLANT Commander Naval Aviation Forces Atlantic
Fleet
COSAL Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
DLR Depot Level Repairable
DOP Depot Overhaul Point
DSR Depot Survival Rate
EM Electronic Module
FLR Field Level Repairable
HSC Hardware Systems Command
ICP Inventory Control Point
ILSP Integrated Logistics Support Plan
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
ILSS Integrated Logistics Support System
IM Inventory Managers
ISEA In-service Engineering Activity
JCN Job Control Number
LCC Life Cycle Cost
LM Logistics Manager





























Level Of Repair Analysis
Material Condition Code
Maintenance Data System
Navy Maintenance Support Office
Naval Electronics Systems Command
Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Sea Combat
Systems Engineering Station
Naval Supply Systems Command
Naval Enlisted Classification
















Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
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SPCC Ship's Parts Control Center
SM&R Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability
STEEP Support & Test Equipment Engineering
Program
TPS Test Program Sets
2M Miniature/Microminiature
3-M Maintenance and Material Management
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APPENDIX B: THIRD POSITION MAINTENANCE
CODES [Ref. 9:pp. 111-21/22]
Code Definition
D Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at depots only.
F Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at the intermediate level afloat.
G Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at both the afloat and ashore
intermediate levels.
H Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at the intermediate levels ashore only.
L (Restricted to SSPO only.)
Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at the organizational level of
maintenance.
Note: To distinguish between the organizational
maintenance capabilities on different classes of ships
the following codes may be used (intra-Navy only) . On
joint programs, Navy will receive and transmit an "0" to
indicate organizational maintenance level.
2 Minesweeper, Yardcraft, Patrol Boat.
3 Submarines.
4 Auxiliary/Amphibious Ships.
5 Major Combatants (Destroyers, Frigates)
.
6 Major Combatants (Cruisers, Carriers, LHAs-
Amphibious Assault Ships)
.
7 Organizational shore activity only; not
authorized for removal/replacement afloat.
S Support items that are removed, replaced, and
used at designated intermediate level
specialized repair activities only. Removal
is not authorized below intermediate level.
Z Support items that are not authorized to be
removed or replaced at any level.
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APPENDIX C: FOURTH POSITION MAINTENANCE
CODES [Ref. 9:pp. 111-22/24]
Code Definition
B Support item for which no repair is
authorized.
D Support item for which the depot level is the
lowest level of maintenance authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from any failure mode.
F Support items for which the intermediate
level afloat (only) is the lowest level of
maintenance authorized by the maintenance
plan to return the item to serviceable
conditions from some but not necessarily all,
failure modes.
G Support items for which the intermediate
level either afloat or ashore is the lowest
level of maintenance authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from some but not
necessarily all, failure modes.
H Support item for which intermediate level
ashore only is the lowest level of
maintenance authorized by the maintenance
plan to return the item to serviceable
condition from some, but not necessarily all,
failure modes.
L (Restricted to SSPO use only.)
Support items for which the organizational
level is the lowest level of maintenance
authorized by the maintenance plan to return
the item to serviceable condition from some
but not necessarily all, failure modes.
Note: To distinguish between the organizational
maintenance capabilities on different classes of ships,
the following codes may be used (intra-Navy only) . On
joint programs, Navy will receive and transmit an "0" to
indicate organizational maintenance level.
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2 Minesweeper, Yardcraft, Patrol Boat.
3 Submarines.
4 Auxiliary/Amphibious Ships.
5 Major Combatants (Destroyers, Frigates)
.
6 Major Combatants (Cruisers, Carriers, LHAs-
Amphibious Assault Ships)
.
7 Organizational shore activity only; not
authorized for repair afloat.
Support item for which a special intermediate
repair activity is the lowest level of
maintenance authorized by the maintenance
plan to return the item to serviceable
condition from some, but not necessarily all,
failure modes.
A nonrepairable support item. No repair is
authorized.
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APPENDIX D: RECOVERABILITY CODES [Ref. 9:pp. 111-25/26]
Code Definition
A Nonrepairable item; requires special handling
or condemnation procedures because of
specific reasons (i.e., precious metal
content, high dollar value, critical
material, or hazardous material).
D Repairable item. Indicates the lowest
maintenance level authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from all failure modes.
The level authorized to direct disposition of
an unserviceable item is the depot level.
F Repairable item. Indicates the lowest
maintenance level authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from all failure modes.
The level authorized to direct disposition of
the unserviceable item is the intermediate
level afloat.
G Repairable item. Indicates the lowest
maintenance level authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from all failure modes.
The level authorized to direct disposition of
an unserviceable item is the intermediate
level, either afloat or ashore.
H Repairable item. Indicates the lowest
maintenance level authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from all failure modes.
The level authorized to direct disposition of
an unserviceable item is the intermediate
level ashore.
L (SSPO use only.)
Repairable item. Indicates the lowest
maintenance level authorized by the
maintenance plan to return the item to
serviceable condition from all failure modes.
The level authorized to direct disposition of
an unserviceable item is the organizational
level.
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S Repairable item. Return to Special
Intermediate Repair Activity. Condemnation
and disposal not authorized below special
intermediate level.
W Repairable item. Item can be restored from
all possible failure modes by the
organizational level but must be returned to
the depot level for condemnation and
disposal
.
Y Repairable item. Item can be restored from
all possible failure modes by the
intermediate level but must be returned to
the depot level for condemnation and
disposal.
Z Nonrepairable item. When unserviceable,
condemn and dispose of at the level indicated
in position 3 of the uniform SM&R code
format.
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APPENDIX E: COMMONLY USED MCCs [Ref. 9: p. 111-27]
Code Definition
D Field Level Repairable.
E (1) IRAM program; (2) Material requiring
lot and serial number control.
G FBM weapon system repairables.
H Depot level repairables.
L Local stock items or items awaiting NSN
assignment.
Q FBM weapon system repairables requiring special
test, special report, or periodic inspection.
W Ground support equipment end item.
X Special program repairables.
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APPENDEK F: MSN INFO BY EQUIPMENT TYPE
The information listed below pertained to the ten NSNs which were
tested by SIMA San Diego during one or both its two test for NEOF rates
on repairables during calendar year 1987. Each subdivision lists the
pertinent information concerning the NSN such as its GOG, MCC, SM&R, net
price, commercial repair price, depot repair price, discovered NEOF
rate, and whether it is listed as a DLR or a progressive DLR. There is
also information concerning the numbers of each NSN which were either
requisitioned or repaired each FY.
AIMS MKm IFF DECODER ;
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-395-0292 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 84 32 $676.00
SM&R PA2GD 85 51 $719.00 91 $298.00 70 $452.00
NEOF RATE 50.00% 86 133 $699.00 60 $499.00
1 Of 2 86
0*7 1 C*i i^T/Nrt f\4\ $298.00
30 $449.00
$404.00Progressive Repairables 87 153 $709.00 J.UU 140
88 15 $354.00
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-395-0295 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 83 39 $628.00
SM&R PA2GD 84 18 $289.00
NEOF RATE 46.00% 85 24 $303.00





$285.00Progressive Repairable 85 36
88 19 $390.00 26 $285.00
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-412-8615 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 80 2 $342.00
SM&R PA2GD 84 10 $607.00 19 $429.00
NEOF RATE 74.20% 85 17 $648.00 34 $161.00
23 of 29 86 34 $335.00
Progressive Repairable 87 50 $340.00 13 $285.00
88 18 $390.00 14 $285.00
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AIMS MK XH IFF DECODER :
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-412-8618 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 84 7 $259.00
SM&R PA2GD 85 20 $648.00 16 $189.00
NEOF RATE 0.00% 86 42 $335.00 23 ,$261.00
Of 1 87 46 $340.00 35 $285.00
Progressive Repairable 88 11 $390.00 14 $285.00
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-412-8620 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 84 9 $607 . 00
SM&R PA2GD 85 13 $303.00
NEOF RATE 52.40% 86 17 $266.00 8 $190.00
11 Of 21 87 29 $270.00 10 $305.00
$295.00Progressive Repairable 87 12
88 20 $418.00
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5895-00-535-8247 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7GH 84 17 $193.20
SM&R PA D 85 5 $198.00 5 $395.00
NEOF RATE 60.00% 86 7 $352.00
6 of 10 87 10 $357.00
NO LONGER LISTED IN API , 88 1 $344.00
NEI COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5840-01-084-8764 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 83 53 $603.00
SM&R PA2GD 84 3 $351.00
NEOF RATE 29.00% 85 3 $311.00 6 $202.00
2 Of 7 86 27 $366.00 32 $529.00 9 $261.00
Progressive Repairable 87 62 $371.00 14 $780.00 7 $265.00
88 18 $418.00 31 $305.00
CV-3333 AUDIO CONVERIHa •
NET COMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5999-01-042-3396 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7EH 84 12 $367.00
SM&R PA2DD 85 35 $318.00
NEOF RATE 44.00% 86 68 $453.00
11 Of 25 87 83 $459.00




NSN: 5845-00-450-1852 FY OTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7HH 82 14 $299.19
SM&R PA5DD 84 5 $523.00 35 $264.59
NEOF RATE 78.00% 85 12 $501.00 20 $315.00







87 32 $476.00 $418.00
88 2 $108.00 $400.00
AN/WRN-5 RADIO NAVIGATION SET
NET OOMMERCIAL ORGANIC
NSN: 5825-00-321-0671 FY QTY PRICE QTY DEPOT QTY DEPOT
COG & MCC 7HH 84 4 $1,130.00
SM&R PA2DD 85 5 $770.00 4 $502.00
NEOF RATE 13.00% 86 12 $727.00 4 $519.00
4 of 30 87 19 $737.00 5 $435.00
DEPOT/DEPOT REPAIRABLE 88 16 $596.00 15 $515.00
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